The Organisation of Military Power in Northern Arakan

The military campaign against Rohingya communities in August and September 2017 involved a complex command structure extending from Myanmar's senior military leadership to regional commanders, combat divisions, infantry battalions and border-security units. Understanding this organisation is essential to establishing how military operations were directed across a large geographical area and how responsibility could extend beyond soldiers who personally committed atrocities.

Myanmar's armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, operated through a highly centralised hierarchy. Senior commanders exercised authority over major combat formations, while regional commands administered military operations within designated territories. The campaign in northern Arakan involved both units normally stationed in the region and additional combat formations brought from other parts of Myanmar.

The distinction between these formations is important. Locally stationed units possessed knowledge of villages, roads, waterways and administrative boundaries, while mobile combat divisions provided additional manpower and operational capability. Their combined participation enabled operations across Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung rather than isolated engagements at individual security installations.

The Authority of the Commander-in-Chief

At the highest level stood Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar's Defence Services. His position gave him authority over the military institution, including major decisions concerning deployment, operational policy, senior appointments and discipline.

Amnesty International's investigation of the 2017 campaign examined confidential military documents and the Tatmadaw's command doctrine. It concluded that senior military leaders exercised substantial control over combat divisions and that information concerning military movements, engagements and weapons use was normally transmitted through established reporting procedures.

This structure is significant because the operations involved formations operating across different townships under a common military hierarchy. The deployment of combat divisions from outside Arakan required decisions at levels above ordinary local commanders.

The existence of command authority does not automatically establish that a particular commander personally ordered every crime committed by subordinates. It does, however, provide the institutional framework for examining whether senior officers ordered unlawful operations, knew of violations or failed to prevent and punish crimes within their effective control.

Soe Win and the Command of Combat Divisions

Vice-Senior General Soe Win occupied a central position in the military hierarchy as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Under the military structure examined by Amnesty International, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army exercised direct authority over mobile combat divisions.

This distinction is important because the 33rd and 99th Light Infantry Divisions were not simply ordinary battalions permanently assigned to northern Arakan. They were mobile formations deployed to areas considered strategically important by the military leadership.

Amnesty International found that decisions concerning the deployment of these divisions, their strength and major operational objectives fell within the responsibilities of senior army commanders. The report identified grounds for investigating Soe Win's responsibility for crimes committed during the operations.

His position therefore provides an important connection between the central military command and the forces operating in Rohingya villages. Establishing responsibility requires examination of deployment orders, operational reporting and the decisions taken after information about abuses reached senior headquarters.

The Western Regional Military Command

The Western Regional Military Command was the principal territorial command responsible for military operations in Arakan. During the 2017 campaign, it was commanded by Major General Maung Maung Soe.

The Western Command controlled locally stationed infantry and light infantry battalions, including units operating in northern Arakan before the arrival of additional combat divisions. These forces possessed an established presence in the region and worked within a military environment closely connected to local security and administrative institutions.

Maung Maung Soe's role was significant because regional commanders exercised authority over forces within their areas of responsibility. Their positions enabled them to receive information concerning developments in different townships and coordinate military activities involving multiple subordinate formations.

In June 2018, the European Union imposed restrictive measures on Maung Maung Soe, identifying his command responsibility for serious human rights violations committed by Western Command forces during the relevant period.

The sanctions were administrative measures rather than criminal convictions. Nevertheless, they reflected an official international assessment that responsibility for the campaign extended into the regional command structure.

Military Operations Command 15

Military Operations Command 15, commonly abbreviated as MOC 15, was an important formation within Western Command. Its area of responsibility included Buthidaung Township, where several of the operations against Rohingya communities took place.

MOC 15 commanded multiple light infantry battalions and provided an organisational structure through which units could be deployed and coordinated. Its commander during the relevant period was Brigadier General Khin Maung Soe, according to European Union sanctions documentation.

The command's role is especially important because independent investigations connected units under MOC 15 to serious violations against Rohingya civilians. The United States Treasury later sanctioned Khin Maung Soe, citing the participation of MOC 15 personnel in the Maung Nu massacre and other abuses.

These findings demonstrate why military command identification cannot stop at the level of the Tatmadaw as a whole. The organisational position of MOC 15 helps investigators trace the relationship between particular battalions, their immediate commanders and the wider regional hierarchy.

The specific events at Maung Nu will be examined in a later massacre chapter. Here, the significance lies in identifying the formation and its position within the military's operational structure.

Battalions Identified Through Rohingya Testimony

A particularly important contribution to the identification of military units came from Rohingya survivors who named officers, described their uniforms and identified the battalions operating in their communities. A subsequent study of perpetrator identification drew upon Rohingya testimony and cross-referenced the information against published military command structures. It identified personnel associated with Light Infantry Battalions 345, 352, 536, 537, 551, 552, 564 and 565, all linked to MOC 15.

The study also identified commanding officers for several battalions and documented connections between military personnel and local administrative structures. This demonstrates that Rohingya witnesses were able to contribute information extending beyond descriptions of violence to the identification of military organisations and individual officers.

The findings are significant for historical accountability because they connect village-level observations with formal chains of command. A witness might know an officer through repeated encounters, recognise a battalion designation or identify the security unit responsible for a particular area. Such evidence must be carefully checked because uniforms, military postings and unit affiliations can change. Nevertheless, Rohingya knowledge of local security personnel provides a foundation for reconstructing the military's presence in northern Arakan.

The 33rd Light Infantry Division

The 33rd Light Infantry Division was one of the principal mobile combat formations involved in the 2017 operations. Its commander was Brigadier General Aung Aung, who was subsequently identified in European Union sanctions documentation.

Amnesty International documented the involvement of the 33rd Division in serious abuses against Rohingya communities, including operations in Rathedaung Township. The organisation also examined evidence that the division's personnel had participated in violations elsewhere in Myanmar before being deployed to Arakan.

The division's involvement is important because it demonstrates that the campaign drew upon experienced combat formations rather than relying exclusively on locally stationed border-security units. In the context of northern Arakan, the deployment of such a formation expanded the military's capacity to conduct operations involving substantial numbers of troops, coordinated movement and the use of military weapons.

The identification of the 33rd Division also allows investigators to examine command responsibility within the division itself, including the authority exercised by its commander and the relationship between divisional headquarters and subordinate battalions.

The 99th Light Infantry Division

The 99th Light Infantry Division was another major mobile combat formation deployed during the campaign. Amnesty International identified its involvement in operations against Rohingya civilians and documented connections between the division and serious violations in northern Arakan.

The division operated within the Tatmadaw's combat-command structure rather than as a permanent component of Western Command. Its deployment therefore required coordination between senior military authorities and regional operations.

The 99th Division was subsequently implicated in grave abuses in the Min Gyi area, including the Tula Toli massacre. The United States Treasury's sanctions documentation described the division's involvement in the campaign and identified serious violations committed by its personnel.

Different official sources have identified commanders associated with the division during relevant periods. Establishing the precise officer responsible for each unit at the time of a particular operation requires attention to dates, appointments and changes in command. For this chapter, the central finding is that the 99th Division formed part of the military's major operational force in northern Arakan. The detailed responsibility of particular officers for the Tula Toli massacre belongs to the dedicated investigation of that event.

Border Guard Police and Military Coordination

The Border Guard Police formed another component of Myanmar's security apparatus in northern Arakan. Its responsibilities included border security, checkpoints and policing functions, but personnel also participated in operations alongside military forces.

During the relevant period, the Border Guard Police was commanded by Thura San Lwin. The United States Treasury subsequently sanctioned him, citing serious human rights violations committed by BGP personnel under his command. Rohingya residents were familiar with the Border Guard Police because its officers operated through local posts and administrative sectors. These structures provided detailed knowledge of settlements and the movements of residents.

A later study of Rohingya testimony identified alleged perpetrators associated with different BGP sectors. The researchers noted that witnesses sometimes used older NaSaKa sector numbers, even though the Border Guard Police had replaced NaSaKa in 2013.

This is an important example of the historical value of Rohingya local knowledge. Investigators needed to reconcile the administrative terminology used by witnesses with later official sector designations. Doing so helped identify personnel without incorrectly treating different sector numbers as separate locations.

The Scale of the Military Organisation

Fortify Rights identified at least twenty-seven Myanmar Army battalions involved in the 2017 operations, including twenty-two light infantry battalions and five infantry battalions. The organisation estimated that these formations could have comprised up to 11,000 soldiers.

It also identified at least three combat-police battalions, potentially comprising approximately 900 personnel. These figures illustrate the considerable military resources associated with the campaign. The numbers should be interpreted carefully. Battalion establishments do not necessarily equal the number of personnel present during each operation, and the total does not establish that every soldier participated in atrocities.

Nevertheless, the number of identified formations demonstrates the organisational scale of the military effort. The operations involved multiple units operating across a broad area rather than a single battalion responding to a localised incident. For Rohingya communities, the concentration of military forces meant that villages could encounter personnel from different formations while remaining subject to the same overall campaign.

Why the Chain of Command Matters

The identification of commanders, divisions and battalions is not merely a technical exercise. It is essential to determining how the military campaign was organised and who possessed authority over the forces involved.

Military operations depend upon orders, reporting procedures, logistics, communications and supervision. Even where individual soldiers commit crimes without explicit written orders, the conduct of commanders must be examined in relation to what they knew, what they could control and whether they acted to prevent or punish violations.

Amnesty International's analysis concluded that Myanmar's command structure provided senior officers with substantial authority and access to information about military operations. Its findings raised grounds for investigating responsibility at multiple levels of the hierarchy.

The testimony of Rohingya witnesses adds another dimension by identifying how these structures operated in particular communities. Their accounts can connect military units to specific places and times, helping investigators move from broad institutional responsibility toward the identification of individual perpetrators.

Part B will examine how the command structure functioned during the campaign, including operational coordination, reporting procedures, the role of military intelligence and the evidence distinguishing documented military planning from orders whose exact contents remain unknown.

The Operational System Behind the Campaign

The military campaign in northern Arakan required coordination between combat divisions, regional units, border-security personnel and supporting formations. These organisations possessed different responsibilities, but their activities were connected through Myanmar's military command structure. The operations were not confined to a single confrontation or an isolated village. They extended across numerous Rohingya settlements and involved forces capable of conducting simultaneous or successive operations in different locations.

Amnesty International's investigation, published in June 2018, examined the relationship between military headquarters, regional commands and combat formations. Drawing upon confidential military documents, interviews and other evidence, the organisation found that the Tatmadaw maintained established procedures for directing operations and reporting military activity. These findings are important because they challenge explanations portraying the widespread violations as merely spontaneous acts by individual soldiers.

For Rohingya witnesses, military organisation was visible through the movements of troops, the arrival of different security units and the coordination of activities within their communities. Their observations provide an essential means of connecting formal military structures to what occurred on the ground.

Orders and Reporting Within the Military Hierarchy

Myanmar's military command system required subordinate formations to report operational information to higher headquarters. According to Amnesty International's examination of military documents, combat divisions operated under strict reporting requirements concerning troop movements, engagements and the use of weapons.

Such reporting procedures are important when investigating the knowledge and responsibility of senior commanders. A large-scale military operation normally generates information concerning where troops are deployed, what activities they undertake and whether armed engagements occur. The existence of these procedures provides a basis for examining what information reached higher command levels during the campaign.

However, the presence of reporting obligations does not prove that every particular atrocity was reported accurately or that a specific written order directed a particular crime. Investigators must distinguish the documented structure of communication from the actual contents of reports that remain unavailable.

The central question is whether commanders possessed effective authority over their forces, what they knew or should have known about violations, and whether they took measures to prevent, stop or punish unlawful conduct.

The Significance of Operational Coordination

The geographical extent of the campaign required substantial military coordination. Forces operating in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung had to move through different terrain, maintain supplies and communicate with their commanders. The participation of both locally stationed personnel and mobile combat formations added another level of organisational complexity.

Independent investigations documented recurring patterns of military activity across Rohingya settlements. Although the circumstances differed between villages, witnesses repeatedly described the arrival of organised security forces and operations involving more than one category of armed personnel.

These patterns are relevant to assessing whether the violence resulted from disconnected local decisions or a broader operational policy. Repetition alone does not establish the contents of an order, but similarities in timing, methods and participating forces can support an investigation into common planning and direction.

Amnesty International concluded that the violations it documented formed part of a highly organised attack on Rohingya civilians. Its findings therefore raised questions about responsibility within the military hierarchy rather than limiting attention to individual perpetrators.

Rohingya Witnesses and the Identification of Military Operations

Rohingya eyewitnesses provided essential evidence concerning the conduct and organisation of military operations. Survivors identified military personnel through repeated encounters, recognised particular officers and described the relationships between local security posts and units arriving from outside their townships.

This local knowledge was particularly valuable because independent investigators faced severe restrictions on access to northern Arakan. Rohingya villagers possessed information about the roads, waterways, administrative boundaries and security installations surrounding their communities. Their testimony could therefore establish details that were difficult to reconstruct from official military statements.

Witness accounts also helped investigators distinguish between different security organisations. Residents sometimes identified personnel by their uniforms, vehicles, weapons, positions or earlier interactions with village authorities. These observations became more useful when compared with military records, photographs and independently established unit deployments.

The identification of a unit by a witness is important evidence, but it must be assessed carefully. Soldiers could operate outside their normal areas, uniforms might be similar and witnesses could be mistaken about an individual's formal assignment. Corroborating such accounts strengthens their value without diminishing the importance of Rohingya testimony as primary historical evidence.

The Role of Local Knowledge in Military Operations

Myanmar's security institutions possessed extensive administrative knowledge of northern Arakan. Local authorities maintained information concerning village locations, household registration, travel permissions and community leadership. Border-security personnel had longstanding contact with Rohingya settlements through checkpoints and local administrative procedures.

This existing knowledge was relevant to the conduct of military operations because forces arriving from elsewhere could operate alongside personnel familiar with the territory. The combination of local knowledge and additional combat capability made it possible to conduct operations across geographically dispersed settlements.

Rohingya witnesses could sometimes identify which security personnel had been stationed locally before the campaign and which appeared during the operations. This distinction may help establish the respective roles of locally based authorities and newly deployed military formations.

However, the existence of administrative records does not by itself establish that particular lists were used to select victims or direct attacks. Such claims require examination of documents, testimony from officials or consistent evidence concerning the use of identifiable records during specific operations.

Military Intelligence and the Flow of Information

Military intelligence and operational reporting formed part of the wider system through which Myanmar's armed forces gathered information and monitored security developments. The relevant historical question is how information about Rohingya communities and military operations was collected, transmitted and used.

The Tatmadaw's intelligence capabilities must be distinguished from proof that every local development was known to senior commanders. Nevertheless, the organisation's reporting system and extensive security presence created channels through which information about operations could reach higher authorities.

Amnesty International's investigation found that senior commanders had substantial authority over combat formations and access to operational reporting. This supported its conclusion that senior officers knew or should have known about serious violations committed by forces under their command.

Rohingya testimony provides another route for examining military knowledge. Where villagers reported threats directly to officers, witnessed commanders supervising operations or identified officials present during particular events, those accounts may help establish knowledge at specific levels of authority. Such evidence is especially important when assessing whether abuses continued despite opportunities for commanders to intervene.

Evidence of Threats Communicated by Field Commanders

Amnesty International documented an important example of military intent through interviews with Rohingya witnesses from Rathedaung Township. Around 20 August 2017, a field commander associated with the 33rd Light Infantry Division met Rohingya community representatives in Chut Pyin.

Seven people who attended the meeting separately described the commander's warning that soldiers would shoot Rohingya villagers if ARSA activity occurred or if residents were considered to have committed wrongdoing. The warning did not distinguish between identifiable armed participants and the wider civilian population.

The importance of this testimony lies in its description of a threat communicated by a military officer before the principal campaign began. It provides evidence relevant to the attitude of field commanders toward civilian protection and the possibility that collective punishment was contemplated.

The account does not establish the precise contents of instructions received by that commander from higher headquarters. Nevertheless, the consistency of testimony from multiple meeting participants makes the incident an important subject for examining operational intent and responsibility. The subsequent Chut Pyin massacre will be examined separately in Chapter 4. Its detailed chronology should not be repeated here.

The Participation of Multiple Security Organisations

The operations involved more than regular army formations. Investigations by Fortify Rights and other organisations documented the participation of police and armed local civilians in attacks against Rohingya communities.

The involvement of different organisations raises questions about coordination, command relationships and the division of responsibilities. Military personnel and police officers did not necessarily operate under identical administrative chains of command, while armed civilians occupied a different legal and organisational position.

The existence of joint activity is relevant to establishing how operations were organised. Investigators must examine whether participating groups acted under direct instructions, received assistance from military personnel or coordinated their activities through local security officials.

Fortify Rights documented instances in which Myanmar authorities provided weapons and training to non-Rohingya civilians before the attacks. Its investigation also recorded Rohingya eyewitness testimony concerning armed civilians operating alongside security forces. The specific participation of individuals in particular massacres belongs to the relevant village investigations. Here, the significance is that the campaign involved several categories of participants whose activities require separate but connected assessments of responsibility.

Logistics and the Capacity for Sustained Operations

The ability to conduct operations across northern Arakan depended upon more than the presence of armed personnel. Troops required transport, supplies, communications and coordination between operational areas. Mobile combat formations also needed arrangements for deployment and continued support.

The movement of substantial military formations into a region and their participation in operations across multiple townships indicate an organised logistical effort. Such arrangements are relevant when assessing whether the campaign was planned and sustained at levels above individual field commanders.

The publicly available investigations reviewed for this chapter do not establish a complete inventory of transport orders, ammunition deliveries, operational budgets or communications records for every participating formation. It would therefore be inaccurate to reconstruct a detailed logistical plan as though those documents had been obtained.

Nevertheless, the documented deployment of combat units, their command relationships and the scale of operations provide substantial evidence of organised military activity requiring institutional resources.

The Meaning of Clearance Operations

Myanmar's military described its activities as clearance operations, a term associated with security operations intended to locate and remove armed opponents from designated areas. The terminology was used in official accounts to present the campaign as a response to threats against state security.

The use of this description did not determine whether the operations complied with international law. The legality of military conduct depends upon the actions taken, the people targeted and the applicable obligations to distinguish civilians from combatants.

Independent investigators found that operations described as security measures involved extensive violence against Rohingya civilians. Fortify Rights and Amnesty International documented evidence that the campaign extended far beyond the pursuit of identifiable armed attackers.

The term clearance operations must therefore be treated as the military's operational description rather than an independent explanation of what occurred. Its use is historically important because it reveals how the authorities characterised their activities, but it does not resolve the question of their actual objectives.

The Distinction Between Planning and Individual Criminal Orders

Evidence of a coordinated military campaign is not identical to evidence that a particular senior commander issued an explicit order to commit genocide. These are related but distinct questions.

Investigators can establish operational planning through deployments, command structures, reporting systems, coordinated activities and the conduct of forces. Establishing individual criminal responsibility may require additional evidence concerning orders, knowledge, effective control and participation in unlawful acts.

Amnesty International concluded that extensive credible evidence warranted investigation of senior military and police officials for direct or command responsibility. It identified thirteen individuals whose roles required particular scrutiny.

The organisation's findings did not constitute criminal convictions. They provided an evidentiary basis for further investigation and prosecution by competent judicial authorities. For Rohipedia, maintaining this distinction strengthens the historical record. It allows the campaign's organised character to be examined without inventing written orders or attributing statements to commanders where no authenticated record has been identified.

Command Responsibility and the Failure to Prevent Crimes

Under international criminal law, commanders may bear responsibility for crimes committed by subordinates when the applicable legal requirements are satisfied. These include the existence of effective authority and control, the commander's knowledge or legally relevant reason to know of crimes, and a failure to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish them.

The principle is important because responsibility for mass atrocities cannot be examined solely through the actions of soldiers at the scene. Commanders who possess the authority to control forces may have obligations to intervene when unlawful conduct occurs.

Amnesty International's investigation examined the Tatmadaw's centralised command structure and the reporting obligations imposed on combat formations. It concluded that senior officers had substantial authority and that the available evidence raised serious questions concerning their knowledge and failure to act.

Determining the responsibility of a particular officer nevertheless requires examination of that individual's authority, the relevant period, the forces under their control and the information available to them. The failure to prevent or punish crimes may constitute a separate basis for responsibility from personally ordering or participating in the underlying acts.

The Importance of Documentary Evidence

Military orders, operational reports, communications records and personnel documents are potentially important sources for establishing how the campaign was organised. They can help identify who authorised deployments, who received reports and how particular decisions were communicated.

Amnesty International's review of confidential military material provided insight into the command system and its reporting procedures. Other investigators used open-source information, official statements, satellite imagery and witness testimony to reconstruct events.

However, the public availability of military documentation remains limited. Rohipedia should not imply that investigators possess a complete archive of operational orders or that every command decision has been established through an authenticated document. The absence of such records from the public domain does not invalidate eyewitness testimony. It does mean that claims concerning specific orders should be attributed to the witnesses or documents supporting them.

A careful reconstruction requires the different categories of evidence to be considered together, while identifying what each can establish.

The Contribution of Rohingya Evidence to Command Accountability

Rohingya survivors were indispensable to the identification of military activity because they observed events at locations inaccessible to independent investigators. Their accounts provided information concerning the presence of officers, movements of forces and conduct of security personnel.

In some cases, witnesses recognised individual officers through previous contact with local authorities. In others, they identified personnel through their roles during operations or through information known within the village. This evidence has significance beyond establishing that atrocities occurred. It can help determine which units were present, which officers exercised apparent authority and whether particular actions were coordinated.

For historical documentation, preserving the original terminology used by Rohingya witnesses is important. Local names for villages, military installations and administrative sectors may differ from official designations. Investigators should record those names accurately and explain the relationship between local and administrative terminology.

Rohipedia's approach should therefore place Rohingya testimony at the foundation of the reconstruction while using documentary and independent evidence to examine the military hierarchy connected to those accounts.

What the Evidence Establishes About the Campaign

The investigations reviewed in this chapter establish that Myanmar's 2017 operations involved multiple combat formations, regional military units, border-security personnel and participating armed civilians. The campaign operated within a hierarchical military institution possessing established command and reporting procedures.

They also provide evidence that senior commanders exercised authority over forces implicated in serious violations. Amnesty International concluded that the available material warranted investigation of individual responsibility at several levels of command.

These findings support the assessment that the campaign was organised and coordinated rather than a collection of unrelated acts by individual soldiers. They also demonstrate why identifying military units and commanders is essential to understanding the destruction of Rohingya communities.

At the same time, the complete contents of operational orders and communications have not been publicly established. The distinction between documented coordination, reasonable investigative inferences and allegations requiring further proof must remain clear.

Conclusion. From Military Organisation to the First Days of Violence

Chapter 2 has examined the military structure through which the 2017 campaign was conducted. It has identified the relationship between senior command, regional authorities, combat formations and border-security personnel, while explaining how operational reporting and coordinated deployments are relevant to establishing responsibility.

The evidence demonstrates that the campaign involved substantial institutional organisation and military resources. Rohingya eyewitness testimony provides essential information connecting these structures to events in individual communities.

The next chapter moves from military organisation to the opening days of mass violence. It will reconstruct the events of 25–29 August 2017 through village-level evidence, focusing on the chronology of attacks and the experiences of Rohingya civilians without repeating the command structure examined here.