Chapter 6. From 969 to Ma Ba Tha
Between 2013 and 2015, the emergence of Ma Ba Tha brought Buddhist nationalist campaigning into a more organized relationship with national lawmaking and electoral politics. For Rohingya, this development mattered because an association claiming to defend the country’s religion could influence decisions about the rights of people it portrayed as outsiders. Its principal achievement was the adoption of legislation affecting religious choice, marriage and reproductive autonomy. By the end of 2015, nationalist demands had acquired instruments of state authority.
Organizational Restrictions and the Emergence of Ma Ba Tha
In September 2013, the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, the official body supervising Myanmar’s Buddhist clergy, restricted the formation of organizations under the 969 name. The United States’ religious-freedom report records a directive issued on 2 September calling for a halt to such organizations. This institutional restriction did not end the wider nationalist campaign.
Ma Ba Tha’s development overlapped with these restrictions. International Crisis Group dates its initial formation to June 2013 and identifies January 2014, when its upper Myanmar branch was established in Mandalay, as the point at which it became particularly prominent. The transition therefore unfolded over several months. Ma Ba Tha provided a more formal structure through which activists could pursue the proposed laws for the protection of “race and religion.”
Usually translated as the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, Ma Ba Tha presented its programme as a responsibility to preserve Buddhism and national identity. From a Rohingya perspective, the consequences depended on whose rights this claimed protection would restrict. The association sought authority to influence government decisions affecting minorities who had little protection against discriminatory administration.
Making National Legislation a Central Objective
Ma Ba Tha campaigned for four laws concerning population control, religious conversion, marriages between Buddhist women and non-Buddhist men, and monogamy. Human Rights Watch recorded that the association had urged Thein Sein’s government to adopt the package in late 2013. By 2015, these demands had become parliamentary business.
The legislative campaign created a route through which nationalist demands could become binding procedures. Registrars, township boards and other officials would administer rules affecting intimate decisions. Their authority would continue beyond any individual rally or campaign. For communities exposed to discrimination, the concern was the additional power that officials could exercise over personal and family life.
Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists challenged the proposals in March 2015. Their joint statement warned that the package contained discrimination based on religion and gender and could deepen existing divisions. They also questioned the need for additional legislation when existing laws already addressed matters such as coerced conversion. These objections challenged the programme before its enactment.
Population Control and Reproductive Autonomy
The Population Control Healthcare Law was adopted in May 2015. Its birth-spacing framework envisaged an interval of at least thirty-six months between births in areas brought under the scheme. Human Rights Watch warned that the proposed arrangements threatened women’s ability to decide when to have children and created opportunities for discriminatory implementation. It also criticized the absence of meaningful participation by women, particularly those from ethnic and religious minorities, in the drafting process.
For Rohingya women, the issue concerned control over their reproductive lives. Healthcare grounded in informed consent allows women to make decisions according to their circumstances. A population-control framework administered by authorities creates a different relationship, particularly where the population concerned already experiences official discrimination. Rights organizations warned that the legislation could extend state interference into decisions that should belong to women themselves.
The law’s adoption established this additional framework. Evidence of its passage must be distinguished from evidence of particular enforcement practices. The immediate historical concern was the authority created and the discriminatory political campaign through which it had been obtained.
Official Scrutiny of Marriage and Religious Choice
The Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law introduced particular requirements for Buddhist women marrying non-Buddhist men. Human Rights Watch’s examination of the proposed legislation described a fourteen-day public display of marriage applications and a procedure allowing objections to reach a local court. These arrangements exposed a couple’s private decision to intervention by others. The organization warned that the measure violated privacy, religious freedom and equal protection.
The religious-conversion legislation established township scrutiny and registration boards. Applicants would have to explain their intended conversion, undergo an interview and complete a study period before receiving official certification. Human Rights Watch warned that the composition of these boards could favour the religious majority and that information collected would be forwarded to government agencies. Religious choice was being placed under administrative supervision.
By August 2015, the Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law, Religious Conversion Law and Monogamy Law had joined the population-control measure in the adopted package. Human Rights Watch’s subsequent annual assessment identified their passage as a successful Ma Ba Tha campaign. The association had demonstrated its ability to secure national legislation affecting personal and family life.
Rohingya Women and Supporting Organizations Respond
Rohingya activists publicly challenged the proposed restrictions. During the 2015 maritime emergency, Women Peace Network–Arakan, founded by Rohingya activist Wai Wai Nu, called for urgent protection of women and children and action against discriminatory government policies. Its appeal specifically identified the “race and religion protection” bills as a threat to religious, marital and reproductive freedoms. Signatories included Burma Rohingya Organization UK and Rohingya Community Ireland, alongside women’s organizations and international rights groups.
This intervention placed Rohingya women’s own demands within a debate dominated by claims about protecting religion and women. Women Peace Network connected immediate protection with changes to policies producing vulnerability. Its position made freedom of choice and freedom from discrimination central to protection.
Opposition also came from civil society organizations inside Myanmar. FORUM-ASIA documented a statement by ninety-seven organizations against the proposed laws, with further endorsements from women’s rights, development and faith-based networks. Women human-rights defenders received threatening messages and telephone calls, including death threats. Public disagreement with the legislative campaign could therefore carry a personal cost.
Legislative Victories and the 2015 Election
Ma Ba Tha celebrated the laws through nationwide events as the November 2015 election approached. Human Rights Watch recorded that Thein Sein claimed credit for the legislation and that some Ma Ba Tha rallies supported the Union Solidarity and Development Party. The campaign made support for the association’s programme a test applied to political parties and candidates.
The political pressure also affected Rohingya participation. Human Rights Watch’s October 2015 assessment linked Ma Ba Tha’s agitation to the government’s removal of Rohingya voting rights and the disqualification of Rohingya parliamentary candidates. The association helped make Rohingya participation a target within an election widely presented internationally as a democratic advance.
This produced a profound imbalance. Nationalist organizations could press parties for commitments while Rohingya lost opportunities to represent themselves. Decisions concerning their place in the country were being influenced by campaigners seeking their exclusion, within a political process that denied them an effective voice.
Opposition to International Protection
Ma Ba Tha-associated activism also challenged international pressure over Rohingya persecution. The International State Crime Initiative’s Countdown to Annihilation documented a Yangon protest on 28 May 2015 at which Ma Ba Tha-affiliated monk U Pamaukkha addressed participants. Some local 969 supporters wore shirts rejecting the association of boat people with Myanmar. The protest occurred while Rohingya refugees and trafficking victims faced an emergency at sea.
The event demonstrated how nationalist mobilization could resist demands for protection by disputing responsibility for the people concerned. International appeals for Rohingya safety were answered through assertions about national belonging. For Rohingya advocates, this made recognition of their identity and the government’s responsibility inseparable from the demand to protect lives.
By the end of 2015, Ma Ba Tha had helped secure national legislation and exerted pressure on electoral politics while Rohingya were denied participation. Its institutional influence marked a new stage in nationalist campaigning: demands directed against minority rights could be advanced through government procedures and political decisions.