Part 17. The 2015 Election, Rohingya Political Exclusion and the Beginnings of Armed Mobilisation in Arakan
Chapter 4. The Political Transition and Rohingya Expectations
The transfer of power to the National League for Democracy in early 2016 brought a new government to Myanmar, but it did not automatically restore Rohingya freedom. For the community, the transition had to be measured through decisions: whether officials would recognise Rohingya identity, meet their representatives, remove discriminatory orders and permit displaced families to recover their homes.
Rohingya demands were concrete. They sought rights and protection in their own homeland, rather than indefinite promises that their situation would be considered after other national priorities. Contemporary statements and testimony show how quickly the incoming government faced that test—and how its early choices raised concerns about continuity with the administration it replaced.
From Election Victory to Executive Authority
The new Parliament began work in February 2016. On 15 March, it selected Htin Kyaw as president. His election marked another stage in the transfer from the military-backed administration to an NLD-led government.
Htin Kyaw took his oath on 30 March. His inaugural commitments included national reconciliation, constitutional change and improved living conditions. Aung San Suu Kyi entered the cabinet, including as foreign minister. The military nevertheless retained control of the Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs ministries.
On 6 April, the creation of the State Counsellor position gave Suu Kyi a further mechanism for leading the government despite the constitutional barrier to her becoming president.
These developments changed the location of civilian political authority. They also changed the basis on which Rohingya could address the NLD: its leaders now held government office and had to answer for the powers they exercised.
Military control imposed substantial constraints. It did not remove the responsibility of civilian leaders to recognise the community, oppose discrimination publicly and pursue remedies within their authority.
Rohingya Rights Were Already on the Transition Agenda
Before the inauguration, Rohingya advocates were pressing for action rather than allowing their demands to disappear into the transfer arrangements.
A British parliamentary debate on 23 March recorded support for BROUK’s calls to confront hate speech, remove restrictions on international assistance, reform the citizenship framework and establish a credible independent investigation into allegations of ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and possible genocide.
The significance of this record is that the incoming administration’s obligations were being identified before it assumed power. Rohingya organisations were not waiting to invent demands after disappointment set in. They were seeking specific protections and accountability as the government was being formed.
The transition therefore presented an immediate question: would international engagement with the NLD strengthen those demands, or would concern for the new administration’s political comfort postpone them?
The End of the Emergency Did Not End the Restrictions
On 29 March, outgoing President Thein Sein lifted the state of emergency imposed on Arakan in 2012. This decision created an opening for the incoming administration, but ending the formal emergency was only one step.
Human Rights Watch called on President Htin Kyaw and NLD-appointed state chief minister Nyi Pu to translate the change into equal protection and the removal of abusive restrictions. Its statement noted that officials had extended a separate curfew in northern Arakan on 8 February for two months. It was unclear whether lifting the emergency would remove that local order.
By 4 May, Human Rights Watch was still urging the president to rescind the curfew in Maungdaw and Buthidaung. Its letter also recorded continuing obstruction of humanitarian access by local officials and security forces.
For Rohingya, this distinction was essential. A national announcement could be welcomed abroad while a local order continued to determine what people could do. The practical test of the transition was whether those enforcing restrictions received—and obeyed—instructions to end them.
Shwe Maung’s Assessment of the First Month
On 3 May, former Rohingya parliamentarian Shwe Maung testified before Canada’s House of Commons Subcommittee on International Human Rights. His evidence provided a contemporary Rohingya assessment of the new administration.
He acknowledged steps towards reform but criticised Suu Kyi’s continuing silence about Rohingya suffering. He argued that the NLD’s approach to Rohingya and Muslim issues resembled that of the previous governing party despite their differences elsewhere.
His testimony also raised the absence of dialogue. When asked about prospects for cooperation, he said that he saw no indication that the government was ready to engage Rohingya representatives inside Myanmar and described unsuccessful approaches to the NLD leadership.
This was Shwe Maung’s assessment, recorded in parliamentary evidence. It matters because it identifies a failure beyond the delay of legislative reform: a community seeking redress could not see a dependable route into discussion with its new government.
Consultation was a demand for political recognition. Rohingya representatives sought to participate in decisions affecting their people, rather than remain the subjects of policies developed without them.
The First Disputes over Recognition
The government’s early handling of the Rohingya name became another test of the transition.
A joint statement dated 16 May and published by ARNO the following day expressed concern that the NLD administration was yielding to extremist pressure. It challenged advice from the Foreign Ministry that foreign embassies avoid using “Rohingya” and defended the community’s right to identify itself.
The eleven signatories included ARNO, BROUK, Bradford Rohingya Community and organisations in Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Finland, Italy and Sweden. Their statement also warned about threats to Sittwe’s remaining Rohingya quarter, Aung Mingalar, and challenged proposed house-to-house checks.
For Rohingya, recognition could not be postponed as an inconvenient matter of vocabulary. Their name expressed the identity through which they claimed belonging and rights. Asking outsiders to avoid it placed the burden of accommodating hostility upon the people facing that hostility.
The new government had an opportunity to reject that pressure. Its approach instead prompted Rohingya organisations to demand protection from the administration that many had hoped would bring change.
Rohingya Organisations Set Out Immediate Measures
The May joint statement supplied a programme against which the government could be judged. It called for respect for Rohingya self-identification, action against hate speech, an end to confinement and the return of displaced people to their communities and properties.
It also demanded the removal of restrictions on humanitarian agencies, protection for aid workers and amendment of the citizenship law to secure full citizenship and accompanying rights. Internationally, it maintained the demand for a United Nations commission of inquiry.
These were interconnected demands. Recognition without protection would leave people vulnerable; assistance without freedom would leave confinement intact; relocation without recovery of property would leave dispossession unresolved.
The organisations were defining what meaningful political change required from the Rohingya position. Their statement also preserved accountability as a priority. A new administration could not extinguish the need to investigate earlier violations simply by presenting itself as a democratic departure.
The Government Asked for Patience
At a joint press conference with US Secretary of State John Kerry on 22 May, Suu Kyi asked for space and patience in addressing the situation. She presented “Rohingya” and “Bengali” as terms carrying political and emotional implications that provoked opposition, and argued for avoiding language that intensified the dispute.
From a Rohingya perspective, that approach treated fundamentally different claims as equivalent sources of tension. The community was asserting its own identity. Its opponents were rejecting that identity and imposing another description upon it.
A government could seek to reduce hostility while still defending people’s right to name themselves. Making recognition dependent on the acceptance of hostile groups gave those groups influence over the terms on which Rohingya could appear in public life.
Requests for patience also needed to be accompanied by visible measures. People living under restrictions could not assess a promise of gradual progress without knowing which orders would be removed, who would implement the change and when they would be able to exercise their rights.
Civilian Responsibility Within a Constrained System
The military’s retained powers were a serious obstacle. However, the division of authority required attention to particular decisions rather than a general exemption for civilian leaders.
Human Rights Watch’s May letter identified actions for the president and state government, including ending official denunciations of Rohingya, rescinding the northern Arakan curfew, improving humanitarian access and publicly opposing anti-Muslim incitement. It also reminded Htin Kyaw that the NLD had previously committed to addressing citizenship fairly and promptly.
For Rohingya, the issue was whether the administration would use its authority to challenge exclusion. Constitutional limitations did not require it to endorse the suppression of their name or leave their representatives without meaningful engagement.
The first months of the transition therefore exposed a gap between acquiring civilian office and extending protection to the community. Rohingya organisations responded by specifying obligations, documenting failures and continuing to seek international support.
What the Transition Had to Deliver
By May 2016, Rohingya demands had become a direct test of the new government’s conduct. The community sought recognition, access to decision-makers, the removal of discriminatory orders, safe return and accountability.
Those demands established a measure of progress rooted in Rohingya lives. Political change would become meaningful when it altered what officials could do to them and what they were free to do for themselves.
The transfer of office had taken place. The restoration of Rohingya rights remained unfinished.